Nowadays an increasing amount of data stored in the public cloud need to be searched remotely for fast accessing. For the sake of privacy, the remote files are usually encrypted, which makes them difficult to be searched by remote servers. It is also harder to efficiently share encrypted data in the cloud than those in plaintext. In this paper, we develop a searchable encryption framework called Linear Encryption with Keyword Search (LEKS) that can semi-generically convert some existing encryption schemes meeting our Linear Encryption Template (LET) to be searchable without re-encrypting all the data. For allowing easy data sharing, we convert a Key-Policy Attributed-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme to a Key-Policy AttributedBased Keyword Search (KP-ABKS) scheme as a concrete instance of our LEKS framework, making both the encrypted data and the search functionality under fine-grained access control. Notably, the resulting KP-ABKS is the first proven secure ABKS scheme with IND-sCKA security in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the ℓ-DCBDH problem derived from the (P, f)-DBDH problem family. Abstract. Nowadays an increasing amount of data stored in the public cloud need to be searched remotely for fast accessing. For the sake of privacy, the remote files are usually encrypted, which makes them difficult to be searched by remote servers. It is also harder to efficiently share encrypted data in the cloud than those in plaintext. In this paper, we develop a searchable encryption framework called Linear Encryption with Keyword Search (LEKS) that can semi-generically convert some existing encryption schemes meeting our Linear Encryption Template (LET) to be searchable without re-encrypting all the data. For allowing easy data sharing, we convert a Key-Policy Attributed-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme to a Key-Policy Attributed-Based Keyword Search (KP-ABKS) scheme as a concrete instance of our LEKS framework, making both the encrypted data and the search functionality under fine-grained access control. Notably, the resulting KP-ABKS is the first proven secure ABKS scheme with IND-sCKA security in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the -DCBDH problem derived from the (P, f )-DBDH problem family.
Introduction
Cloud computing [14] provides on-demand computing resources that are accessible via the Internet, including computing power and data storage. With the convenient cloud services, users can outsource their computing resources to the cloud, and access them through terminals with low computing capabilities, such as mobile devices. Usually, those terminals also have low network connectivity due to the transmission technology, access cost, and other factors.
In terms of data storage, one important function is data search. Since all the user data are stored on the cloud server, users have to send search queries to the server to search for the data containing certain keywords. However, the normal search operation for plaintext is no longer working when data privacy is considered, since all the data are encrypted and cannot be read by the server.
To perform search on encrypted data, it is impractical for the user to do the search locally with all the data downloaded from the server, due to the high demand on the bandwidth. It is also impractical to give the server the user secret key due to privacy concerns. Thus searchable encryption has been introduced such that the search operation is performed by the server, but the server cannot get any meaningful information from the search query or the encrypted data. In searchable encryption, all the data files and their associated keywords are encrypted. To search for the data with certain keyword, the user generates a trapdoor for the keyword and enquires the server with the trapdoor. The server searches the whole database to locate the data where the encrypted keyword matches the keyword embedded in the trapdoor. During the searching process, the server only knows whether an encrypted keyword matches the user trapdoor or not, and nothing else. After that, the server returns the search result to the user who can download the ciphertexts and decrypt the data.
In Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) [8] , the data and the keywords are encrypted for only one user (i.e., the intended receiver of the data). In contrast, data can be encrypted with certain attributes in AttributeBased Encryption (ABE) [16] . For instance, Alice can encrypt some data with attributes "full-time" and "student". Later, any user can decrypt the resulting ciphertext if the attributes in the ciphertext match the policy associated with the user. Thus Bob associated with a policy "(full time AND student) OR staff" can decrypt the above ciphertext. The corresponding searchable encryption for ABE is named Attribute-Based Keyword Search (ABKS) [19, 21] . As in ABE, Alice can encrypt the data and its associated keywords using certain attributes. After uploading the ciphertexts to the server, Bob can do the search and decryption since the attributes used by Alice in the encryption matches Bob's policy. This feature is very important in the cloud environment where a user can share data with multiple users by encrypting the data only once. However, to the best of our knowledge, no ABKS scheme proposed in the literature is proven secure. Hence, one of our goals is to construct ABKS schemes with provable security.
In addition, keyword search functionality is usually associated with an encryption scheme where both the data and the keywords are encrypted for the same receiver(s). This paper also aims to provide a universal construction of searchable encryption schemes from some existing encryption schemes. This enables us to add a compatible keyword search functionality to an existing cryptosystem without re-encrypting all the data.
Related Work
Diffie and Hellman introduced the notion of Public-Key Encryption (PKE) [11] where Alice encrypts a message with Bob's public key, and Bob decrypts the ciphertext with his secret key. Based on the idea of using the user identity as the public key [17] , Boneh and Franklin proposed a practical Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme [9] where Alice encrypts the message with Bob's identity. In 2005, Sahai and Waters introduced Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption which can be treated as the first Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [16] , an instance of Function Encryption [20] . In ABE, the decryption keys of the users and the ciphertexts are associated with access policies and attributes, respectively. If and only if the attributes match the policy, the ciphertext can be successfully decrypted. Depending on how the identity and the ciphertext are associated, Attribute-Based Encryption schemes are classified into Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) [3, 12, 15, 16] and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) [4] . In KP-ABE, Bob's secret key is associated with a policy. After receiving the ciphertext encrypted with some attributes from Alice, Bob can decrypt it if and only if the attributes match his policy. In CP-ABE, the ciphertexts are associated with policies, and the secret keys are associated with attributes.
To enable the search functionality for encrypted data, various searchable encryption schemes [1, 8, 10, 13, 19, 21] have been proposed under different settings. Boneh et al. [8] introduced PEKS, which is used with a conventional public key encryption scheme. Later, Identity-Based Keyword Search (IBKS) schemes were also proposed [1, 10] . Recently, due to the popularity of ABE, there have been some research works on ABKS [19, 21] . In addition, there are also keyword search schemes for other encryption variants, such as Broadcast Encryption [2] .
To the best of our knowledge, [19, 21] are the only ABKS schemes proposed in the literature. However, neither of those schemes is proven secure. In particular, after analysing the ABKS scheme in [19] , we found the scheme is flawed where an adversary can always distinguish keywords from a ciphertext by testing
For the KP-ABKS scheme in [21] , the security proof is invalid (see section 4.3) and thus the security of this scheme remains unknown. For the CP-ABKS scheme in [21] , no formal security proof has been provided.
In terms of provable security, it depends on the hardness of some computational problems (e.g. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) [11] , etc.). Shoup [18] introduced the generic group model which was used to obtain the complexity lower bound regarding the hardness of DLP and DHP. Later, dealing with bilinear maps, Boneh et al. [6] introduced the generic bilinear group model and the general Diffie-Hellman Exponent Problem. Besides, the generic bilinear group model is also used in [5, 7] for analysing the Decisional Linear (DLIN) Problem and q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Problem.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we introduce a new problem family named Decisional Bilinear (P, f )-Diffie-Hellman problem ((P, f )-DBDH problem, for short). We prove the (P, f )-DBDH problem is computationally hard in generic bilinear group model if the polynomial f is not dependent on the polynomial set P . Based on the (P, f )-DBDH problem, we derive a hard computational problem named DecisionalCombined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem ( -DCBDH problem).
As the main contribution of this work, we introduce two new notions named Linear Encryption Template (LET) and Linear Encryption with Keyword Search (LEKS), and provide their formal definitions. LET can model different asymmetric encryption schemes, including but not limited to PKE, IBE and ABE schemes, which have the property of linearity. The linearity property requires a sub-algorithm e(g, g)
αs ← D(SK, C 1 , . . . ) in the decryption algorithm where SK is the secret key involved, (C 1 , . . . ) are the ciphertext components and for
Given an encryption fitting LET, we provide a semi-generic conversion to a LEKS scheme where the construction is generic but we require security proofs for individual conversions. We also define two security models for LEKS schemes: Indistinguishability under Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attack (IND-CKA) and its weaker Selective-ID version (INDsCKA). With LET and our conversion from LET to LEKS, we can construct PEKS from PKE, IBKS from IBE, ABKS from ABE, and so on.
To illustrate the feasibility of our semi-generic framework, we give an instance of LET and then apply our conversion to procude a LEKS scheme. We first show that a variant [15] of Goyal et al.'s ABE scheme [12] fits LET by proving it has the property of linearity. Then we apply our LEKS conversion to convert the KP-ABE scheme into a KP-ABKS scheme. After that, we prove the resulting KP-ABKS scheme is IND-sCKA secure in the random oracle model under -DCBDH assumption. It is worth noting that to the best of our knowledge, our converted KP-ABKS scheme is the first proven secure KP-ABKS scheme.
Paper Organisation
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Beginning with section 2, we define (P, f )-DBDH problem family and -DCBDH problem, and prove the hardness of those problems. In section 3, we define LEKS and its security model, followed by the definition of LET and the LEKS conversion from LET. After that, an instance of LEKS conversion is given in section 4, converting a KP-ABE scheme to a KP-ABKS scheme. The resulted KP-ABKS scheme is proven secure in section 4.3 under the security model defined in section 3.2. Finally, the conclusion is addressed in section 5.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem Family
In this paper, we use the same bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 as in [9] for simplicity where G 1 , G 2 are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p and g is a generator of G 1 .
s is dependent on P if exists s 2 + 2s constants a i,j , b k and c l such that
where at least one of b k or c is non-zero.
We present the family of Diffie-Hellman problems as follows.
, there is an algorithm A can distinguish D τ and D ρ with advantage:
where D ∈ R D represents that D is uniformly and independently chosen from D. Alternatively, the problem can be represented as
As from the definition above, Decisional Bilinear (P, f )-Diffie-Hellman ((P, f )-DBDH in short) problem family is an enhanced DDH problem on the group G 1 where the adversary A is now able to do bilinear pairing operations on G 1 . The (P, f )-DBDH problem family is computational hard if and only if the advantage Adv
is negligible. Since there is no known proof of the hardness of this problem family, we show the complexity lower bound in the generic bilinear group model [6] . As in [6] , we emphasise that a lower bound in generic groups does not imply a lower bound in any specific group.
m be two random encodings (injective maps) where
If f is not dependent on P , the lower bound of the advantage Adv (P,f )−DBDH of solving the (P, f )-DBDH problem (definition 2) for the adversary A is stated as follows with at most q 1,× , q 2,× queries to the group operation oracles O 1 × , O 2 × and q e queries to the bilinear pairing oracle O e : ε 1 × ε 1 → ε 2 .
Our schemes are based on a dynamic version of the above (P, f )-DBDH problem. To describe and show the hardness of the problem, we begin with the following lemma.
. . , p s , q 1 , . . . , q s ) be a 2s-tuple of n-variate polynomial. Let T be a variate, R = (P, QT ) = (p 1 , . . . , p s , q 1 T, . . . , q s T ) = (r 1 , . . . , r 2s ) be a 2s-tuple of (n + 1)-variate polynomial. If f is not dependent on O, f is not dependent on R. . . . , p s , q 1 , . . . , q s ) be a 2s-tuple of n-variate polynomial. Let T 1 , . . . , T be variates, R = (P, QT 1 , . . . , QT ) = (p 1 , . . . , p s , q 1 T 1 , . . . , q s T 1 , . . . , q 1 T , . . . , q s T ) be an ( + 1)s-tuple of (n + )-variate polynomial. If f is not dependent on O, f is not dependent on R.
e , and Z ∈ R G 1 . Giving two probability dis-
, there is an algorithm A can distinguish D DCBDH and D ρ with advantage:
Alternatively, the problem can be represented as
The Decisional -Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman ( -DCBDH) problem belongs to the (P, f )-DBDH problem family. We prove that the -DCBDH problem is hard by showing the advantage Adv Due to the space limitation, the proofs of the above Theorems and Lemmas will be provided in the full version of the paper.
Linear Encryption with Keyword Search

Definition
In general, a searchable encryption scheme involves three roles and consists of two encryption parts. In detail, the roles are contributor, server and user, and the encryption parts are the message encryption part and the keyword encryption part. A general purpose searchable encryption scheme works as follows. Alice, as a contributor, encrypts a file using the message encryption scheme and the related keywords using the keyword encryption part for the target users, including Bob. Let header denote the keyword ciphertext, and payload denote the file ciphertext. Since a file may be associated with multiple keywords, Alice may generate multiple headers for the payload. After that, Alice assembles the headers and the payload as a single ciphertext, and sends the ciphertext to the server. Bob, as one of the target user, can ask the server to search the ciphertext with certain keywords. To do secured search, Bob generates a trapdoor for each keyword to be searched, and then uploads the trapdoors to the server via a secure communication channel. Once the server receives the query with the trapdoors from Bob, the server begins to test whether the keywords in the headers match those in the trapdoors. Note that the keywords are not visible to the server, and the headers and trapdoors match only when the corresponding keywords are the same and Bob is one of the intended users that the headers are encrypted for. After searching for all related ciphertexts, the server allows Bob to download the matching payloads. Finally, Bob can download the payloads with matching headers. In addition, a trusted authority is required in the identity or attribute-based setting. Formally, we define Linear Encryption with Keyword Search as follows, focusing on the keyword encryption part in a general searchable encryption scheme.
Definition 4 (Linear Encryption with Keyword Search).
A linear encryption with keyword search (LEKS) scheme, involving the contributors, the servers, the users and the trusted authority, consists of the following five (probabilistic) polynomial time algorithms:
The system setup algorithm run by the trusted authority takes a security parameter 1 λ , and outputs a pair of master secret key M SK and public key P K for the trusted authority.
-SK ← KeyGen(M SK, I S ): The user key generation algorithm run by the trusted authority takes a master secret key M SK and a user identity I S , and generates a user secret key SK for the user associated with that identity. -C ← LEKS(P K, I C , W ): The keyword encryption algorithm run by the contributor takes a public key P K, a target identity I C and a keyword W , and outputs a ciphertext C of the keyword W . To maximum the generality, I C is viewed as a set that the user I S can access the ciphertext only if I S ∈ I C . It is equivalent to F (I S , I C ) = 1 with a predicate function F . -T ← T rapdoor(SK, W ): The trapdoor generation algorithm run by the user takes a secret key SK and a keyword W , and generates a trapdoor T of the keyword W . -1/0 ← T est(C, T ): The deterministic test algorithm run by the server takes a ciphertext C ← LEKS(P K, I C , W ) and a trapdoor T ← T rapdoor(SK, W ) where SK ← KeyGen(M SK, I S ), and outputs
In the public key scenario where users are identified using public keys generated by themselves, the trusted authority is not required and the algorithm KeyGen is not used. Instead, the Setup algorithm is run by individual users, and outputs a pair of secret key SK and public key P K for that user. In addition, the scheme is required to be correct.
Definition 5 (Correctness).
A LEKS scheme is correct if the following statement is always true:
∀I s ∈ I c , ∀SK ← KeyGen(M SK, I s ), ∀T ← T rapdoor(SK, W ), T est(C, T ) = 1.
Security Model
In LEKS, we consider that the server is honest but curious. In addition, we do not consider the keyword guessing attack (KGA), since the server can always generate ciphertexts with certain keywords to test with the trapdoor legitimately. However, we can prevent anyone from extracting the keyword directly from the trapdoor by applying an one-way function such as a preimage-resistant hash function. We present two security games: Indistinguishability under Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attack (IND-CKA) and its weaker Selective-ID version (IND-sCKA). We first define the IND-sCKA game (Game 1) where an adaptive adversary A tries to distinguish a ciphertext generated from either keywords W 0 or W 1 :
1. A selects a target identity set I T and submits it to the challenger S. 2. S runs Setup(1 λ ) to generate a key pair (M SK, P K) and passes P K to A. 3. A can adaptively ask S for the secret key SK of the user with identity I by querying the key generation oracle O KeyGen . At the same point, S records I in the identity list I. The restriction is that I must not be in I T . 4. A can adaptively ask S for the trapdoor T of the user identity I with the keyword W by querying the trapdoor generation oracle O T rapdoor . If I is not in I T , it can be resolved that A queries the oracle O KeyGen to obtain the secret key SK of I and further obtains the trapdoor T ← T rapdoor(SK, W ). Otherwise, S runs the algorithm KeyGen and then the algorithm T rapdoor to get the trapdoor, and passes it to A. At the same point, S records the queried keyword W in the keyword list W. 5. At some point, A outputs two keywords W 0 and W 1 to be challenged where those two keywords must not be in the keyword list W. 6. S randomly selects b to be either 0 or 1 uniformly. Then S generates a ciphertext C ← LEKS(P K, I T , W b ) and passes it to A. We define the advantage of winning Game 1 as follows
Definition 6 (IND-sCKA Security). A LEKS scheme is Indistinguishable under Selective-ID Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attack if Adv
IND-sCKA A is a negligible function for all adversary A winning the Game 1 in polynomial time.
Next, we define the IND-CKA game (Game 2), which is similar as the INDsCKA game. The difference is that A is given the public key P K in IND-CKA before submitting the target identity set I T .
Definition 7 (IND-CKA Security). A LEKS scheme is Indistinguishable under Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attack if Adv
IND-CKA A is a negligible function for all adversary A winning the Game 2 in polynomial time.
Game 1: IND-sCKA
Game 2: IND-CKA
Linear Encryption Template
In this subsection, we define the Linear Encryption Template (LET). Informally, a LET models an asymmetric encryption scheme, consisting of the senders, the recipients and the trusted authority. Alice, as the recipient, gets her secret key from the trusted authority using her identity where her public key is her identity. If LET is modelling a PKE scheme, Alice's secret/public key pair is generated by herself, and the trusted authority is not required. To securely send a message to a set of recipients, including Alice, the sender Bob encrypts the message into a ciphertext, and sends it to Alice. Once Alice receives the ciphertext, she can decrypts and obtains the original message if and only if she is one of the target recipients. Furthermore, if an encryption scheme fits LET, we can use it to construct the corresponding LEKS scheme in section 3.4. Formally, we describe the definition of Linear Encryption Template as follows.
Definition 8 (Linear Encryption Template).
A linear encryption template, involving the senders, the recipients, and the trusted authority, consists of the following four (probabilistic) polynomial algorithms:
The system setup algorithm run by the trusted authority takes a set of system parameters, such as the description of groups, security parameters and randomnesses, and it reuses these parameters. The algorithm also takes a component α, which is used to create the ciphertext. The output of this algorithm is a pair of master secret key M SK and public key P K of the trusted authority. -SK ← KeyGen(M SK, I S ): The user key generation algorithm run by the trusted authority takes a master secret key M SK and a user identity I S , and generates a user secret key SK for the user associated with that identity. -C ← Encrypt(P K, I C , M, s): The encryption algorithm run by the sender takes a public key P K, a target identity set I C , a message M and a randomness s, and outputs a ciphertext C of the message M . The randomness s is used to bind the ciphertext parts in C and further to bind other ciphertext parts when constructing LEKS schemes. It is required that the ciphertext must be in the form of C = (C 0 , C 1 , . . . ) where
The deterministic decryption algorithm run by the recipient takes a secret key SK and a ciphertext C, and outputs the original message M . The decryption process is required to be two steps. The first step is to run the sub-decryption algorithm D to get e(g, g) αs ← D(SK, C 1 , . . . ). Then the second step is to extract the message M = C0 e(g,g) αs . Importantly, the sub algorithm D is required to have linearity:
If there is no trusted authority that users generate their key pairs by themselves, the algorithm KeyGen is not used and the algorithm Setup is run by the user, outputing a pair of user secret key SK and public key SK. In addition, the scheme is required to be correct.
Definition 9 (Correctness).
A LET scheme is correct if the following statement is always true:
Keyword Search From Linear Encryption Template
In this subsection, we build our LEKS scheme with from a LET scheme as the keyword encryption part. To construct a fully searchable encryption scheme, we can reuse the LET scheme as the message encryption part, and combine with the LEKS scheme. Alternatively, we also can use other encryption schemes as the message encryption part. The main idea of the construction is to use the LET part for authentication and combine it with a keyword equality test with the same randomness. Let Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be a LET modelled encryption scheme. Our LEKS scheme works as follows.
-(M SK, P K) ← Setup(1 λ ): Given a security parameter 1 λ , the algorithm generates two groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order p, and specifies a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . the algorithm also selects a random generator g of G 1 , and a preimage resistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → G 1 , which may be modelled as an random oracle. After that, the algorithm chooses two randomness x 1 , x 2 ∈ R Z + p , and calculates g 1 = g x1 and g 2 = g x2 . Then the algorithm packs all above elements into params, sets α = x 1 x 2 , and passes to the algorithm Π.Setup to obtain the key pair Π.M SK and Π.P K. Finally, the algorithm keeps the master secret key M SK = Π.M SK, and publishes the public key P K = (G 1 , G 2 , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , Π.P K).
-SK ← KeyGen(M SK, I S ): For key generation, the algorithm Π.KeyGen is directly invoked. return SK ← Π.KeyGen(M SK, I S ). -C ← LEKS(P K, I C , W ): To encrypt a keyword W for a target identity set I C , the algorithm chooses two randomness r 1 , r 2 ∈ R Z + p . Then it computes
r1 and C 2 = g r1 1 to encrypt the keyword W . After that, the algorithm invokes Π.Encrypt with r 2 to get the ciphertext (C 0 , C 1 , . . . ) to assure the target identity set I C . Finally, the algorithm assembles two parts together C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 1 , . . . ) as the full ciphertext bound using r 2 where
x1x2r2 is dropped. Since C 0 is not used in C, we can safely setting the message M to 0 when invoking Π.Encrypt.
To generate a trapdoor of the keyword W , the algorithm selects a randomness s ∈ R Z + p . Then it calculates T = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) where
s and T 3 = SK s . For SK s , the operation works the same as in definition 8.
For equality tests of both the keyword and the identity, the algorithm tests the equality of the following return statement. return e(C 1 , T 1 )/e(C 2 , T 2 )
Theorem 3. The proposed conversion from the LET scheme to the LEKS scheme is correct if the corresponding encryption scheme modelled by LET is correct.
Proof. To verify, we calculate the left hand side of the test equation first.
Then we calculate the right hand side of the test equation.
As E 1 = E 2 , the correctness is proved.
However, we are uncertain about the security of the above construction, since some components are shared outside the encryption Π that may break the security of Π in its original model. Therefore, we require individual security proof for each conversion to ensure the security.
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Keyword Search
In this section, we show a useful instance of our LEKS conversion by converting a KP-ABE into a KP-ABKS scheme. We starts with an ABE scheme [15] which is a variant of Goyal et al.'s scheme [12] while the function T defined in [12] is replaced with a random oracle. Then we convert it into a LEKS scheme by the method in section 3.4. Finally, we prove the resulted LEKS scheme is IND-sCKA secure in random oracle model.
Base Scheme
The ABE scheme [15] modelled by LET works as follows.
-(M SK, P K) ← Setup(params, α): The system setup algorithm reuses the parameters params, g 1 = g x1 , and g 2 = g x2 . The master secret key is y = x 1 . Since the function T is replaced with a random oracle, the algorithm is required to choose a cryptographic hash function H : {0, (g 1 , g 2 , H) ).
-SK ← KeyGen(M SK, I S ): In KP-ABE, the user identity set I S is the policy modelled as an access tree T (details in [12] ). The algorithm chooses a random polynomial q x for each non-leaf node x ∈ T in a top-down manner. For each non-leaf node x, the degree d x of the polynomial q x is d x = k x − 1 where k x is the threshold value of that node. For the root node, the algorithm sets q root (0) = x 1 . For other nodes, the algorithm sets q x (0) = q parent(x) (index(x)). With polynomials for the access tree T is decided, the algorithm generates the secret key components for the user. For each leaf node x, the algorithm chooses a random number r x ∈ R Z + p , and calculates D x = g qx(0) 2
H(attr(x))
rx , R x = g rx . Return SK = (T , {(D x , R x )} x∈leaves(T ) ). -C ← Encrypt(P K, I C , M, t): In KP-ABE, the target identity set I C is the attributes γ. To encrypt, the algorithm calculates C 0 = M · e(g 1 , g 2 ) t , C 1 = g t , C 2 = γ. For each attribute attr i ∈ γ, the algorithm computes C i = H(attr i ) t . As required by LET, we note that C 0 = M · e(g 1 , g 2 ) t = e(g x1 , g x2 ) t = e(g, g) x1x2t = e(g, g) αt . Return C = (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , {C i } attri∈γ ).
-M ← Decrypt(SK, C): At first, the algorithm checks whether T (γ) = 1 or not. If the attributes do not match the policy that T (γ) = 0, the algorithm returns ⊥. Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds the sub-algorithm D as follows. For those matching attributes attr i = attr(x), where attr i ∈ γ and leaf node x ∈ T , the algorithm can decrypt that node by calculating Then the algorithm can decrypt the non-leaf node x ∈ T by using polynomial interpolation. Let S x be the child set of the node x. Since T (γ) = 1, the algorithm can decrypt the root node that F root = e(g, g 2 ) t·qx(0) = e(g, g 2 ) x1t = e(g, g) x1x2t = e(g, g)
αt
The algorithm sets F root as the output of sub-algorithm D. Finally, the algorithm computes the message M = C 0 /F root and returns M .
The correctness has been shown in the description of the decryption algorithm. We also show that the above scheme has the linearity property required by LET.
Theorem 4 (Correctness).
The above KP-ABE scheme is correct. For the decryption of non-leaf nodes, the computation becomes
Thus F root = F s root .
Construction from the Base Scheme
In this section, we apply the LEKS conversion as follows with some key notes.
